The 2008/9 recession had a pronounced impact on the financial performance, stability and output of Britain's volume housebuilders, leading to a historic decline in new housing supply. 
Introduction
The supply of new homes is one of the biggest political and societal challenges facing the UK Government in the early 21st century. The historic undersupply and continuing shortage of new homes (CLA 2013) , rapidly accelerated by the 2007/8 housing market crash, has contributed to what some commentators argue to be the worst housing crisis of a generation (KPMG/Shelter 2014). Rising household formation rates (DCLG 2010) remain unquenched by historically low levels of housing production. An increase in the house price-to-earnings ratio together with real rising house prices (Halifax 2015) is leading to worsening affordability (Fingleton 2008 , Meen and Andrew 2008 , Meen 2011 , reaffirming housing's status as a basic human need (Leckie 1992 , Edgar et al 2002 and reshaping traditional notions of housing as a commodity (Sweeney 1974 , Pattillo 2013 ).
In recent decades, the study of new housing has been dominated by a concerted interest not in the housebuilders themselves, but rather in understanding the structural causes of housing supply constraints (Bramley 1993 , White & Allmendinger 2003 , Saiz 2010 , Ball 2011 , Ball and Nanda 2014 . Particular attention in this regard has focused primarily on issues pertaining to the slow and complex planning system (Monk & Whitehead 1999 , Mayo & Sheppard 2001 , Bramley 2007 , Barker 2008 , Ball 2010 and the lack of available housing land Whitehead 1996, Dixon and . Despite this valuable scholarly endeavour, there remains an under-emphasis on investigating how the attitudes, motivations and business strategies of British speculative housebuilders -the key delivery agents of new homes -limit or stimulate new home delivery; not least in the housebuilding industry's relationship with important political priorities around planning for housing development. There remains a key test for academics and policy makers in better understanding the nature and operation of British housebuilders if policies seeking greater levels of output from them are to be realised. A more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of behavioural change in the speculative housebuilding industry and a deeper understanding of what limits or stimulates speculative residential development, is arguably necessary (Payne 2013) .
The 2007/8 credit crunch and ensuing recession had a significant impact upon the British speculative housebuilding industry in financial and output terms. During this time, Britain bore witness to some of the lowest housebuilding rates since records began (see Figure 1 ) and the financial stability of Britain's biggest volume housebuilders was significantly undermined (see Figure 2 and Figure 3 ). Whilst it is not clear if the credit crunch or recession had a lasting effect on the structure and organisation of the housebuilding industry (see Gibb et al 1997) , as the dominant players still remain (see: www.constructionindex.com), it is likely that the legacy of such substantial economic shock on the structure of housing provision (Ball 1999) will significantly shape the trajectory of housing supply as Britain transitions into the post-recession era. 350,000 400,000 450,000 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/increasing-the-number-of-available-homes) to 'get Britain building ' (DCLG 2012b) . Whilst market stimulus measures, such as Help to Buy (DCLG 2012b) , are designed ostensibly to support a beleaguered housebuilding industry out of recession, the different normative aims of policy makers and speculative housebuilders raises a series of significant questions around how we build consensus and narratives for post-recession housing growth. Indeed, Gibb et al (1997) remind us that '…the ceaseless conflict between builders and planners is in part inevitable because of irreconcilable disputes over the use of land and a division between profit orientation and the wider social goals and responsibilities of the planning profession' (p. 1756).
With this is mind, this paper sets out to examine the impact of the recession on the attitudes and motivations of Britain's biggest housebuilders with the purpose of investigating what behavioural legacies could confront policy makers in their attempts to meet the housing needs of a postrecession Britain. In order to explore these issues, the paper asks the following three research questions: . This increased activity was a profitable one, with many of the biggest housebuilders reporting record outputs in turnover, margin and pre-tax profit (Figure 2 ). These markers of prosperity were to change in 2007, where the onset of the credit crunch and global financial crisis had significant impacts on the financial stability of much of the industry (Figure 3 ). This journey through boom and bust in speculative housebuilding in the early 21 st century, from fervency to collapse, is an exemplar of the inherent nature of risk and speculation underpinning the structure of housing provision in Britain and Taylor Wimpey 1 n/a n/a n/a 360.2 n/a n/a n/a 4,714 n/a n/a n/a 15.2 n/a n/a n/a 14,862 (Payne & Barker 2015) . In this sense, risk is contingent on broader shifts in the institutional environment of speculative housebuilding as well as being the result of individual firm decisions (Payne 2013 is most acute for housebuilders when they engage in land and housing markets as they are subject to these dynamic, often volatile market mechanisms which influence the price and value of the key inputs (land) and outputs (homes) of the speculative business model (Barker 2004 , Payne & Barker 2015 .
Speculative volume housing development typically involves housebuilders committing capital upfront to land acquisition, planning permission and construction programmes before its return as profit via the sale of the new homes developed (Adams & Tiesdell 2013 ). This process can take, on average, anywhere from 6 months to 20 years, depending on the size and complexity of the site or the amount of units being built (Payne 2009) . A worked example of this cash flow process is shown in Figure 4 . The speculation of capital in this way introduces a series of risks in speculative housing development and helps explain the prevalence of a strategic focus by housebuilders on two key aspects of that development process, namely land acquisition and construction efficiency (Payne 2013) . 
Source: Authors own analysis
During the land acquisition process, a speculative housebuilder will search for suitable development sites in the best market locations (Adams and Watkins 2002) as determined by its individual strategic business focus and development priorities (Payne 2013) . Once identified, the housebuilder will generate a land value with which to make an offer to the landowner. To do so, the housebuilder must accurately forecast total revenue (the sales values of their end products) and deduct from this the total cost of development (including planning, design, construction and profit costs), to arrive at a residual land value (Leishman at al 2000) . If acceptable, the landowner will typically enter into a conditional contract with the housebuilder, who it is agreed will buy the land upon the receipt of both a fully implementable planning consent and a satisfactory detailed site investigation survey (Payne 2009 The volume housebuilding industry's fundamental focus on land acquisition as a key business driver means, for some authors at least, that housebuilders are more concerned with acquiring the best possible land at the best possible price (Adams and Watkins 2002) , than with issues of design or product and process innovation (Ball 1999 , Adams 2004 , Adams and Tiesdell 2004 ).
However, whilst not emphasised in the literature, risk also contributes to the way in which housebuilders approach design. It is well known that speculative volume housebuilders favour the use of standardised housing products and construction materials (Nicol and Hooper 1999) and limit the use of innovative process methods and product design (Ball 1999 , Tiesdell & Adams 2004 ). This is because design standardisation promotes construction efficiency due to economies of scale and scope in design costs, logistics and procurement (Gibb 1999) , allowing for the benefits of repetitive skills, accurate cost and time forecasting and achieving blanket building regulations (Adams and Watkins 2002) . However, Carmona et al (2003: 47) remind us that standardised approaches to design can also represent a rational response to the range of risk and uncertainty that housebuilders constantly face, including:
• Volatility in the market and land costs (in the pattern of demand and confidence of potential purchasers).
• Risks of delay between the decision to build and completion.
• Changes in the availability of financing for both builder and purchaser.
• Changes in the availability and cost of materials and labour.
Like Kate Barker in her review of housing supply (Barker 2004) , Carmona et al (2003) argue that the long and irreversible nature of the speculative housing production process (by comparison with other commodities) increases the uncertainty faced by speculative housebuilders, which leads to '…difficulties in accommodating substantial changes during the production process' (p.47). Such reinforces the use of standardised design and construction efficiency in speculative housing production (see also Payne 2013).
In summary, risk is inherent in the speculative business model of housing supply and has fundamentally shaped the way in which housebuilders approach residential development. The reliance on standardised design and production processes, together with a resolute focus on land acquisition, are as much the result of risk mitigation as of other, more prosaic explanations such as economies of scale or restricted land supply.
Towards a behavioural analysis of recessionary British housebuilding
Effective solutions to tackling chronic housing undersupply in Britain by lifting housing output remain elusive, in policy terms at least, and Britain continues to bear witness to some of the lowest housebuilding rates since records began . However, it remains obvious that a significant increase in the volume of new homes built will be necessary to tackle undersupply and relieve the upward pressure on house prices (Stephens 2011) . This, in turn, will require a step change in the business practices and output rates of the speculative housebuilding industry, Whilst some insight into housebuilders' recessionary behaviours can be seen in the re-negotiation of s106 agreements and reduced housebuilding rates on sites that were consented prior to the credit crunch (DCLG 2013) , it is likely that assumptions around the expected and/or anticipated behavioural response of housebuilders to the recession are largely based on activity from previous boom/bust cycles in the housing market (see Gibb et al 1997) . Indeed, variance in the severity, duration, frequency and intensity of housing market boom/bust cycles, and the regional differentiation of such, implies that the behavioural response of housebuilders cannot be judged to be the same for each occurring cycle, or be assumed to be spatially homogenised.
Research Method
The empirical work presented here set out to examine the behavioural reactions of British volume housebuilders to the recession. The research approach centred on using qualitative 
Immediate behavioural responses to the credit crunch and housing market crash
During 2008/9, in the immediate aftermath of the credit crunch and the shift of the British economy into recession, Britain's biggest housebuilders were dealing with an ensuing shock and awe rippling through the collapsing finance, housing and land markets of speculative housing provision. Whilst the ways in which housebuilders were financially affected by such a turn of events has been well documented, it is less clear how housebuilders responded behaviourally to such turbulence or what the nature of their decision making was during those testing times.
The research revealed that the immediate response of housebuilders to the credit crunch and ensuing recession was, serendipitously, dependent on their financial position immediately before the crash, specifically their level of gearing and exposure to risk through capital lock up in land purchases and construction programmes. Whereas some housebuilders were unfortunate as a result of being highly geared with significant capital lock up, others were comparatively in a more Despite the differential financial positioning of housebuilders affecting their immediate sensitivity to the credit crunch, the research revealed that the business approaches adopted by housebuilders during those turbulent times followed a broadly similar pattern. This was because all housebuilders found themselves with vastly reduced sales rates (and therefore income) but an ongoing requirement to service existing loan and credit facilities, which required a return on the capital employed in existing development programmes. This motivation to 'find the floor' was also necessary for housebuilders in reappraising their budgets, ascertaining their income levels over the course of a financial year and managing their balance sheets, as the following quote illustrates:
"What we tried to do was find the floor before the market found the floor. And when I say that, by constantly reappraising our budget on what we thought our income was going to be from sites".
Two other ways in which housebuilders sought to generate and maintain a flow of income through the recession was to entice sales by offering incentives such as discounts, deposits and part exchange to prospective purchasers; and, to work in partnership with housing associations to build and deliver their product on owned sites:
"…part-exchange became such a big thing because we were actually generating people's deposit by overpaying them for their own house".
"We brought in some housing association... [T]here were some associations that were looking to expand. And they took advantage of builders as well, looking to expand their asset base in the recession by buying units off-stock. But we actually built their product for them, we took their designs on board, built their product and we kept the site going… [I]t gave us our completions and kept our cashflow".
Beyond the need to keep building in order to generate income, a small number of housebuilders sought to maintain a presence on site for reputational reasons, in the hope this would drive sales.
By continuing to build houses during the downturn, these housebuilders sought to create the perception that they were still 'in the game', hoping it would have a positive impact on the marketing success and sales rates of their developments. Beyond these site-based strategies utilised by housebuilders to generate income flow and cash return during recessionary times, housebuilders also looked to their land portfolios to keep their business operations going. This strategy involved housebuilders initialising deliverable strategic land (i.e. land which had a likely chance of gaining planning permission through its allocation in the local plan), and taking it through the planning process. Upon the granting of a fully implementable planning consent, housebuilders exercised the option to purchase the land at current market value. This strategy enabled housebuilders to buy land at current market value and construct and sell houses at current market prices, all at an acceptable profit margin. The following quote explains:
"[It] was deliberate, we had a long-term option that was at a good discount that we knew … as I said earlier you know, if you can bring a site on-stream that's above your standard margin in a prime area with the right product designed properly, you tick all the boxes, it will sell. In a bad market good sites always sell. So we'd set it all up, everything was correct and we would have made a lot more money if we were building it today but relative to what was happening at that point we made an awful lot of money on that one site".
This section has demonstrated that the way in which housebuilders responded to the early stages of the credit crunch and recession was driven by a need to generate a flow of income in order to service bank loans and credit facilities to avoid going into liquidation. For those housebuilders that did not survive the recession, their demise may well have been caused by failed attempts to pursue cash return.
Recessionary reflections: elucidating fragility in the speculative business model
The research indicated that housebuilders' fervent pre-recessionary experiences significantly shaped their recessionary attitudes towards 'doing business' and in particular, shaped their perceptions of risk and fragility in the speculative business model. Housebuilders acknowledged that the fervent speculation characterising the height of the booming housing market was not normal. Rather, it was the result of opportunistic behaviours aimed at securing developable land in highly competitive circumstances to profitably feed hot housing markets.
The fervency evident amongst housebuilders during those pre-recessionary times has since dissipated, leaving a residual adversity which signals a cultural shift towards greater due diligence and caution and a growing desire for predictability and stability. One such housebuilder, in reflecting on this fervency, highlighted the push and pull factors of land and finance markets in shaping their pre-recession behaviours:
"Of course at the time everybody were chasing every little bit of land because the banks were pushing money at developers and therefore it were creating a false position where people were being encouraged to buy land, and that were in itself making land values totally unrealistic".
Another housebuilder reflected on the unsustainable nature of their business operations in the fervent pre-recession business environment, when contrasted with the gearing and subsequent financial exposure of their company: However, for a modest number of builders, the permanency of such caution remained dubious, particularly under the hypothetically considered circumstances of housing market recovery and price inflation. For some, an undercurrent of alternation remained in their thought processes of a possible shift back to the pre-recession fervency were a new boom to occur:
"…and the key thing is don't lose them. Because as the market moves on it's easy just to forget, easy to forget …". "Your memory gets short and you forget and you start doing things that maybe were … maybe you wouldn't have done before and then all of a sudden, cumulatively…you've paid too much…you've expected too much you know, you predicted to sell it too quickly and before you know it …".
This section has demonstrated that the pre-recession fervency experienced by housebuilders had a marked impact on the way in which they did business during the recession, and in particular, on their perceptions and attitudes towards speculation. However, it also revealed that for some housebuilders, the lessons of the recession may not run that deep and a return to pre-recession fervency could emerge if sustained house price inflation becomes a feature of Britain's postrecession era.
Changing cultures of risk: towards a more risk averse business model?
Whilst previous research refers to the risk averse nature of the British speculative housebuilding model (see Payne 2013 , Payne 2012 , Payne 2009 ), it does so at a cursory glance, providing limited empirical evidence to elucidate the risk averse attitudes, motivations or business behaviours of housebuilding firms. In seeking to fill this gap, this section of the paper presents evidence of how the recession affected the day-to-day decision making of Britain's biggest housebuilders, particularly their land behaviours, indicating the emergence of a more risk averse recessionary business model.
The research revealed that the willingness of housebuilders to accommodate risk, in its broadest sense, within their speculative business model was notably scaled back as a result of their recessionary experience. As previously noted, the learning curve that housebuilders experienced as they transitioned through the changing macroeconomic climate highlighted fragility in the model of speculation. As such, the recessionary experience gave housebuilders an opportunity to reflect on and re-examine their business behaviours and consider new ways to mitigate against risk:
"…everybody's more risk-aware and risk-averse than they were pre-recession. But it's not necessarily a bad thing, we're probably a lot better versed in all aspects of the business than we were pre-recession".
As housebuilders' attitudes towards risk changed through their recessionary experience, so too did their perception of risk and indeed, their willingness to 'take a chance' in the speculative delivery of new homes: Such findings, whilst elucidating the link between pre-recession fervency and post-recession risktaking, also indicated that housebuilders' risk appetite was driven by their ability to accurately predict price and value. Indeed, the pre-recessionary booming housing market enabled housebuilders to 'bet on the market' by predicting anticipated sales values, likely higher than ostensive predictions, thereby generating an inflated land value to beat off stiff competition in the land market. As such, the due diligence and prudent decision making evident amongst housebuilders during emergent recessionary times was targeted on their behaviour in the land market. Indeed, housebuilders' recessionary approaches to land acquisition were notably affected by the recession, resulting largely in increased scrutiny, time and financial/personnel resource during the process: 
Towards Recovery: behavioural legacies and implications for housing supply
The level of housing delivery we can expect from the volume housebuilding industry as we transition into recovery is difficult to predict, and requires further research to unpack how housebuilders are responding to Britain's recovering economy and housing market. Indeed, the extent to which the behavioural adaptations of recessionary speculative housebuilding emerge as behavioural legacies in the post-recession era is difficult to foresee. However, this research raises a number of issues that may lay challenge to policy makers' ambitions of seeing a significant increase in speculative housing output. Firstly, the very fact that volume housebuilders are focussing their recessionary business on generating cash return rather than volume output
indicates that a business model of driving efficiencies may well result in suppressed housing completions for some time; not least until preferable macro-economic conditions re-emerge or housebuilders achieve the levels of income return necessary to grow volume output. Whilst we do not know how housebuilders are seeking to 'gear up' as economic recovery takes hold, it is unlikely that volume output will occur until business stability and market confidence returns. Thirdly, the desire for a measure of steadiness by volume housebuilders and a return to calmer waters evidences a reduced fervency and appetite for speculative behaviour. Equally, it indicates an industry desiring normalcy and steadiness as the hangover from the credit crunch dissipates.
The industry's claims that their pre-recessionary experience was not normal is, in many ways, a stark warning to those who expect post-recessionary completion rates to mirror those of the prerecessionary era, in terms of both the quantum and rate of output. Whilst this research has not revealed how housebuilders are responding to the emerging post-recession era, or what strategies housebuilders are adopting to shift from a business model of cash return to one of investment and growth, it is likely that any significant volume output from housebuilders during these times will be entirely on their terms. Such behaviours may require targeted policy interventions to stimulate market demand and improve business confidence in those market areas most deeply affected by the recession or which are currently unfavourable to the industry due to price instability or lack of strategic fit.
Indeed, policy makers pursuing nationally operative demand-side stimulus measures, such as Help to Buy, may find some success if they increase appetite for new homes by enhancing the financial opportunity to buy. Such would offer the industry confidence to invest in new land opportunities, bring land forward for planning permission and begin construction programmes to serve those emerging markets. However, such intervention may well serve to heighten demand for land and development in market locations that have fared slightly better in the recession when compared to others. Indeed, housebuilders may decide to focus on those locations demonstrating more predictable sales values, as they offer a less risky opportunity to generate income and pay off bank debts. Such behaviour may have significant spatial implications for the delivery of new homes as Britain emerges out of recession.
However, demand side policy interventions focussing on the output of the speculative housebuilding model (the homes) are likely to be blunted should policy makers restrict or irritate the availability or flow of housebuilders' key input measures (land). As housebuilders seek to increase rates of housebuilding in response to recessionary market demand, the extent to which they can increase building and sales rates on existing individual sites may be limited (see Adams and Leishman 2008) . It follows that housebuilders may wish to increase the number of outlets rather than their build out rates to meet growing market demand whilst mitigating market risk.
Under such circumstances, this would challenge the planning system to effectively manage the delivery of greater levels of housing land to match any upswing in housing market demand.
Further, should new housebuilding activity present a distinct spatial patterning, the result of housebuilders' behavioural legacies from recessionary experiences seeking predictability, the planning system may find itself under greater pressure to mediate between the spatially-targeted appetites of the land and housing markets.
Conclusion
The UK is approaching a new era in housebuilding. Chronic housing shortages and a housing supply system catastrophically afflicted by the global financial crisis look set to redefine both the institutional relationship between the state and market in housing supply and the capacity of the speculative housebuilding industry to respond to the shifting policy ideals of increased housing output. The state, through its planning, finance and regulatory systems, is attempting the complex orchestration of change, but it is a process that is seeking to influence an equally complex, weather-beaten housebuilding industry with a lack of understanding and certainty over future conditions (Carmona et al 2003) .
It is likely that the effective reorientation of the state and the market towards a new era of housebuilding will require common understanding, dialogue and synergy. However, Adams Further, whether housebuilders are exhibiting a familiar pattern of learning lessons and then forgetting them, as each business cycle through boom and bust takes place, is an interesting contention. Does each cycle through recession and recovery yield similar behavioural patterns of fervency and collapse in volume speculative housebuilding? Whereas this research presents a familiar tale of fervency to collapse (see Gibb et al 1997) , it is difficult to contend that similar behavioural responses follow, as no comparative research exists. However, this research indicates that the business cycle of the first decade of the 21 st century induced a myriad of institutionallyconstituted behavioural responses by housebuilders; arguably, these are more characteristic of the institutional model of speculation in British housing supply than those more prosaic explanations focusing solely on the profit and greed motivations or financial mismanagement of individual housebuilders. From this perspective, it is the inherent characteristics of the system, rather than the individual business decisions of housebuilders, that become the focus of analysis and indeed, the target of policy interventions. It follows that a better understanding of how the model of speculation limits or stimulates volume housebuilding activity will yield more appropriate policy interventions.
This paper has emphasised the importance of understanding behavioural change as a key feature in assessing and evaluating Britain's housing supply issues and the capacity of the volume housebuilding industry to respond to government initiatives seeking significant increases in housing output. It has sought to develop a deeper understanding of recessionary behaviour and to challenge assumptions behind housebuilders' supply behaviours. The purpose of such an endeavour is to highlight to role of academics in selling the benefits of behavioural analysis to inform policy development, implementation and evaluation and to contribute to the growing literatures on constraint and behavioural analysis in housing supply.
